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ABSTRACT 
  This Article explores the historical development of the academic 
analysis of corporate law over the past forty years through the 
scholarship of one of its most influential commentators, Professor 
James D. Cox of the Duke University School of Law. It traces the ways 
in which corporate law scholarship changed from the 1970s to the 
present, including the rise of economic theory and empirical work in 
the study of corporate law. It shows how Professor Cox’s early 
scholarship shaped and challenged economic orthodoxy, while his later 
work used empirical analysis to help corporate law become a more 
dynamic and richer field.  
  Throughout his career, Professor Cox’s scholarship has focused on 
the protection of shareholder rights. He has rebuffed contractarians’ 
attacks on shareholder protections using a variety of economic, 
psychological, and empirical techniques. Professor Cox’s support for 
investors has continued in the wake of financial-market crises, 
corporate scandals, and the challenges of globalization. He provides an 
outstanding example of how a thoughtful academic can influence 
theories and market conditions with several decades of valuable 
insights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past forty years, corporate law scholarship has produced 
wide-ranging, penetrating, and sophisticated analysis on par with any 
field in the legal academy.1 Spurred by the law and economics 
revolution of the 1970s—which prompted varied research, expansive in 
scale and international in scope2—corporate law scholars have joined 
the vanguard of interdisciplinary analysis within the academy.3 Even as 
it has pushed corporate law in new directions, this intellectual 
revolution has also reinvigorated longstanding questions that 
corporate law has yet to satisfactorily resolve, questions made all the 
more pressing by the transformation of the corporate economy over 
the past forty years: For whom should the corporation be run? Are 
those who run the corporation sufficiently accountable? How should 
these answers change as our presumptions about the corporate, 
economic, and political worlds shift?  
This Article examines the development of modern-day corporate 
law by examining the career of a remarkable man Professor James D. 
Cox whose scholarship over his forty-five years in the academy has had 
a profound influence.4 Cox began as a teaching fellow at Boston 
University School of Law in 1970 and—after a series of rapid 
promotions at other law schools—joined the Duke Law faculty in 1979, 
where he has remained. A central figure in the field of corporate law, 
Cox’s career illuminates the transformation of the field as intellectual, 
economic, political, and technological changes rendered obsolete old 
frameworks and demanded new legal responses. 
 
 1. For examples of works addressing the changes in corporate law scholarship over the past 
four decades, see BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE TRAJECTORY OF (CORPORATE LAW) SCHOLARSHIP: 
AN INAUGURAL LECTURE GIVEN IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE OCTOBER 2003, at 38–82 
(2004); Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to the 
Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1040–52 (2012); William W. Bratton, Jr., The 
New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 
1498 (1989); Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 
347, 349–51 (2005).  
 2. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Law & Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (1997) (“[T]he rate of intellectual return on relatively 
straightforward problems was exceedingly high.”); see also Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study 
of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 141–42, 145–47, 158 (2006) 
(tracking the emergence of empiricism across the legal academy). 
 3. See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Events Studies in the Law (pts. 1 & 2), 
4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141 (2002) (providing examples and explaining the emergence of 
corporate law empirical studies).  
 4. For Professor Cox’s biography, see James D. Cox, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/
fac/cox [https://perma.cc/E89A-GFZL].  
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Cox has written on a variety of topics, but a central theme running 
through his work has been the protection of shareholders. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, he made his mark as a scholar by challenging the 
contractarian approach to corporate law, viewing this legal-intellectual 
innovation as a threat to the protection of shareholders.5 In the new 
millennium, he has continued to support shareholder rights in the face 
of new threats as corporate scandals, globalization, and the global 
financial crisis posed new problems to traditional means of defending 
shareholders.6 Cox’s work has been innovative as well as traditional. 
Although he was often skeptical of some new trends, his scholarship 
incorporated recent developments in economics, psychology, and later 
empirical methods, and he drew attention to overlooked issues of 
organizational culture, while still demonstrating the value of more 
traditional doctrinal and analytical approaches to legal scholarship. In 
so doing, he provided a model for how careful legal scholarship can 
address new ideas and situations. 
This Article describes the development of corporate law 
scholarship from the 1930s to the present and Cox’s influence on it. 
Part I explains the transition from Berle and Means’s trust paradigm, 
to the rise of contractarianism, to the eventual counterreaction against 
contractarianism. It focuses on four of Cox’s articles that responded to 
the underlying assumptions and implications of contractarianism. Part 
II evaluates the evolution of legal scholarship as the contractarian 
battles stalemated. It begins with four of Cox’s pieces in which he 
analyzes the importance of accounting standards and the role of 
gatekeepers, and then discusses several of his recent empirical legal 
studies.  
I.  FROM BERLE AND MEANS TO JENSEN AND MECKLING 
A. Berle and Means and the Trust Paradigm 
Modern corporate law scholarship began with Professors Adolf 
Berle and Gardiner Means’s seminal book, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, which identified the central issue of corporate 
law as the “separation of ownership and control,” by which the 
dispersal of share ownership effectively removed control of the public 
corporation from its putative owners, the shareholders, and gave it to 
 
 5. See infra Part I.C. 
 6. See infra Part II.A. 
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its managers.7 This development, left unchecked, would have freed 
managers from oversight and enabled managerial self-dealing.8 
Professor William Bratton explains that the remedy proposed by Berle 
and Means for such unfettered managerial power is that there “should 
be a pervasive equitable limitation on power granted to corporate 
management” under which management’s power could only be 
exercised “for the pro-rata benefit of all shareholders.”9 Following this 
“trust paradigm” for corporate law, the judge’s role in corporate law 
would be to scrutinize management and use their equitable powers to 
provide “solutions to problems that demanded a remedy.”10 Although 
the details of this view changed over time, for forty years, the belief 
that the power imbalance between shareholders and managers was a 
problem, and that the solution was increased oversight and regulation 
of one form or another, constituted the dominant framework for 
corporate law scholarship.11 
In the early 1970s, when Cox entered the academy, perhaps the 
ablest defender of this view was Professor Melvin Eisenberg.12 
Eisenberg’s pathbreaking work, The Structure of the Corporation, 
stands as a high-water mark for the trust-paradigm-inspired legal 
scholarship.13 In this work, Eisenberg identified the main shortcomings 
 
 7. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932). On whether or not this prescription was correct, see Brian R. 
Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 443, 466–67 
(2009).  
 8. To be clear, the exact stance taken by the authors of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property is complicated. Although much of the work is an attack on unfettered managerial 
power, in at least one famous passage, it welcomes such managerial freedom, looking forward to 
a day when management could evolve into a “neutral technocracy” that would manage the 
corporation for the interests of multiple constituencies. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 
312–13; see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail 
of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 861–62 (2010) 
(explaining Berle’s view that, because public opinion directly affected managers, the outside 
community could impose a “conscience” on the corporation).  
 9. William W. Bratton, An Anatomy of Corporate Legal Theory, 24 RES. L. & ECON. 21, 30 
(2009); see Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 
(1931).  
 10. See Bratton, supra note 9, at 31. Of course, the trust paradigm was significantly modified 
over the years, and even if corporate law’s trust paradigm left space for managerial self-interest, 
it never approximated trust-law doctrine. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 1498.  
 11. See CHEFFINS, supra note 1, at 40–49. 
 12. Cox would later join Eisenberg in his classic business organizations casebook. See 
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (11th unabr. ed. 2014).  
 13. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976). The book 
expounds upon and refines the work of several of Eisenberg’s earlier articles: Melvin Aron 
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of the existing law as its failure to map the realities of the public 
corporation14 and its consequent inability to provide a coherent 
framework that would “protect the legitimate interests of 
shareholders” while still ensuring the corporation’s efficient 
management.15 In some ways, the work was prescient, as when it called 
for independent monitoring boards and identified institutional 
investors as potential active players in corporate governance.16  
That said, its solutions fit comfortably within the existing 
paradigm, inasmuch as they were to be incorporated into the 
mandatory framework of corporate law.17 Eisenberg’s solution called 
for governmental interventions to solve the problems first sketched by 
Berle and Means, specifically the problem of managerial “wrongdoing 
or impropriety” and the need to protect shareholders.18 Eisenberg’s 
specific proposals included improving shareholder access to the proxy 
machinery, creating mechanisms to preserve and empower certain 
types of noncontractual private ordering, and regulating the work of 
auditors and independent directors.19  
B. The Rise of the Contractarians 
As Cox began his career, the “contractarian” revolution in 
corporate law loomed. The contractarians were a group of corporate 
law scholars influenced by the spreading law and economics 
movement, who picked up an ideological baton first carried by Henry 
Manne.20 In a series of articles starting in the early 1960s, Manne had 
 
Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1970); Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, 
and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375 (1975); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The 
Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1577 (1971); Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate 
Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969); see also Bratton, supra note 9, at 30–32 (discussing 
generally the trust paradigm of corporate law advocated by Berle and Means).  
 14. See EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 18.  
 15. Id. at 319.  
 16. See id. at 56–63, 156–69. 
 17. See id. at 317–18. 
 18. David L. Ratner, Book Review, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1484, 1488 (1976) (reviewing 
EISENBERG, supra note 13). 
 19. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 317–20. 
 20. See Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, 
and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
305, 307 n.3, 355 (2013). 
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been witheringly critical of Berle and Means.21 Berle and Means had 
concluded that, without legal intervention and judicial oversight, the 
separation of ownership and control would enable managers to self-
deal and injure shareholders, often with impunity—a conclusion 
present as well in Eisenberg’s work. Manne vehemently disagreed. 
Why, he asked, would investors continue to invest in equity markets if 
managers were as unaccountable as Berle, Means, and their followers 
claimed?22 Manne’s answer was that shareholders were already well-
protected. Existing market constraints⎯most notably the market for 
corporate control⎯served as effective limits on managerial graft and 
overreach.23 Good, efficient managers correlated to strong returns for 
healthy companies, and poor, ineffective managers produced weak 
returns.24 Stock prices would reflect whether the managers were good 
or not, enabling the market for mergers to oust poor managers and shift 
those underperforming assets into the hands of better managers, with 
shareholders benefiting from the consolidation.25 For Manne, the 
market, not mandatory rules for corporate governance, provided the 
best protections for shareholders. 
Although Manne struggled to be heard in the 1960s and early 
1970s, by the late 1970s, his critique gained traction, partially due to the 
emergence of transaction-cost-based economic scholarship,26 which in 
turn was heavily influenced by Professor Ronald Coase. In his classic 
 
 21. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. 
REV. 399, 399–407 (1962); see also Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 117–20 (1965) [hereinafter Manne, The Market for Corporate 
Control] (addressing Berle’s contention that control is a corporate asset); Henry G. Manne, Some 
Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1431 n.13 (1964) (stating that the 
Berle and Means thesis of ownership and control “fits foundations, universities, and other 
nonprofit organizations far better than it does the large corporation in which it was designed”).  
 22. Henry G. Manne, The Myth of Corporate Responsibility or Will the Real Ralph Nader 
Please Stand Up?, 26 BUS. LAW. 533, 534 (1970). Manne states:  
[I]f things were as Berle believed, it is very difficult to understand why 30 million 
Americans would continue to put money into the hands of corporate 
executives . . . . We would have to assume that American investors were either the 
greatest collection of fools the world had ever seen or that they were charitable to a 
degree that even saints could not aspire to. 
Id. 
 23. See Manne, The Market for Corporate Control, supra note 21, at 117–20.  
 24. See id. 
 25. See id.  
 26. See Romano, supra note 1, at 347, 349–51. But see William J. Carney, The Legacy of “The 
Market for Corporate Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 215, 227, 231–33, 238–44 (1999) (arguing that Manne’s ideas influenced this field of study 
and the courts through the late 1960s and early 1970s, before his ideas spread more widely through 
the academy).  
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article The Nature of the Firm, Coase sought to address the question of 
“why a firm emerges at all in a specialized exchange economy.”27 Coase 
presented his theory as a tradeoff between the benefits of market 
exchanges, in which an entity would choose a contractual relation with 
an outside party, against internal firm exchanges, in which the 
hierarchical firm structure was preferred.28 In showing how contracting 
costs help explain firm formation, Coase provided legal academics a 
glimpse inside the “black box” of the firm.29  
In 1976, Professors Michael Jensen and William Meckling 
operationalized Coase’s views of the “black box” for the legal 
academy.30 Using the familiar paradigm from Berle and 
Means⎯centered on the separation of ownership from 
control⎯Jensen and Meckling provided “systematic economic 
content” to the earlier observations by couching their studies in 
marginal utility and introducing agency-cost theory into their 
analysis.31 Jensen claimed that this sort of economic analysis would 
rapidly permeate the field.32 And as economic theory expanded from 
market applications to judicial decisionmaking33 to corporate law 
scholarship, Jensen’s claim seemed accurate.34 
Undoubtedly the most influential work applying law and 
economics to corporate law was that of Judge Frank Easterbrook and 
Professor Daniel Fischel. In a series of articles—and then their classic 
book The Economic Structure of Corporate Law—they effectively 
founded the contractarian school, blazing a trail for later law and 
 
 27. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937). 
 28. Id.; see Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on the Theory of 
Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 214 (1993). 
 29. Johnston, supra note 28, at 215–16. 
 30. Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs & Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 31. See CHEFFINS, supra note 1, at 44–45; Romano, supra note 1, at 347. 
 32. Michael C. Jensen, Organization Theory & Methodology, 58 ACCT. REV. 319, 324 (1983). 
 33. Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics and Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 
281, 294 (1979). 
 34. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). Easterbrook and Fischel’s work 
would become the most-cited article of the 1980s and the twenty-fourth most-cited article of all 
time as of 1996. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 751, 761, 765 (1996). Their work trails only Manne’s Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control amongst corporate works for citations, and is one of only three corporate law pieces in 
the top one hundred most-cited law review articles. Id.  
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economics scholars.35 Beginning in 1981 with The Proper Role of a 
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, Easterbrook 
and Fischel supplemented legal analysis with an empirical study of 
stock prices and market mechanisms.36 They not only showed how 
certain transactions created value but also how market-based “self-
deterring” mirrored and buttressed corporate law.37 In doing so, their 
work also presented a powerful presumption that ran counter to much 
of corporate law scholarship up until that point: rather than require 
further regulation, corporate entities would, on their own, select their 
own governance to the point that it was efficient and profitable.38 As 
one reviewer of their book noted, in Easterbrook and Fischel’s 
account, corporate law already provided participants in the 
corporation the protection they needed, and “the need for legal 
reforms and government regulation goes out the window.”39  
By the mid-1980s, the “prairie fire” of law and economics 
analysis—particularly its contractarian version, which depicted the 
corporation as a mere “nexus of contracts”—had swept through the 
academy.40 This analysis helped explain existing market-actor 
behavior,41 while deemphasizing shareholder protection as a core 
function of corporate law. In characterizing corporate law as enabling 
 
 35. For a more complete accounting of their groundbreaking work, see generally FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
(1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and 
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate 
Control Transactions, 91 YALE. L.J. 698 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate 
Control Transactions]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory 
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Frank 
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983).  
 36. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.  
 37. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 35, at 707.  
 38. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 9, at 34–35 (discussing the “deregulatory presumption” in 
modern corporate law and the prevalence of self-regulating strategies).  
 39. Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2222 (1992). 
 40. CHEFFINS, supra note 1, at 28 (quoting Douglas Branson, A Corporate Paleontologist’s 
Look at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 745 (1989)).  
 41. See generally Bhagat & Romano, supra note 4 (listing examples of empirical studies that 
incorporate economic research and explain topics as diverse as the value of minority shareholder 
voting rights, the emergence of “corporate specialization,” the overpayment of bidders, the 
synergistic gains of corporate-acquiring firms, and the effectiveness of antitakeover 
amendments). 
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law that conformed to economic rationality rather than mandatory law 
that imposed strictures on the self-interested, the contractarian school 
implicitly validated the present structures of corporate law and pushed 
for fewer mandatory provisions in the law. By the end of the decade, it 
was clear that the value judgment presented in Berle and Means’s 
original work⎯that separation of ownership from control was a 
problem in need of a solution⎯was no longer treated as gospel.42 To 
some, it just sounded like a plea to retain the status quo.43 
C. The Response to Contractarianism 
Although a majority of academics conceded the general merits of 
economic and other social-science-based methods of analysis, many 
sharply disputed the contractarians’ conclusions.44 Eisenberg was one 
of the most prominent critics. Having been the profession’s leading 
voice for continuing the work started by Berle and Means, he struggled 
to use the new tools of economics, and his work was sharply challenged 
by many of the new school of corporate scholars throughout the 
1980s.45  
In important corners of the profession, however, Eisenberg’s 
arguments were being echoed. Authors like William Allen,46 Victor 
 
 42. William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 
NW. U. L. REV. 180, 190 (1992); see also Robert John Schulze, Book Note, Can This Marriage Be 
Saved? Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in Corporate Governance Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1607 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)) 
(challenging a series of critiques of the corporate law theory paradigm). 
 43. It should be noted that law and economics approaches need not result in the 
antiregulatory conclusions reached by Easterbrook and Fischel—hence the need to distinguish 
between their version of contractarianism and broader approaches to economic theory. For a 
different take focusing on the theory of the firm, see Bodie, supra note 1.  
 44. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An 
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1626 (1989) (“[T]he permissibility of 
deviations from the traditional standards of corporate law should be judged primarily in terms of 
the competence of courts or other agencies to monitor these departures and prevent 
opportunism.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law 
Literature, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 589–90, 595–97 (1984); id. at 595 (“[I]t is extremely 
unlikely that market forces acting alone will produce an optimal solution of agency-cost problems 
in the context of the publicly held corporation.”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of 
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1585–98 (1989) (highlighting the importance of 
corporate law legal rules created by the courts and the legislature). 
 45. For an example of this type of critique, see generally Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the 
Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526 (1989). 
 46. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 278 (1992) (“To approach understanding, we must be able to see legal 
rules and principles as social constructs, affected by their internal logic, but affected even more 
profoundly by the social world in which they exist.”). 
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Brudney,47 and John Coffee48 raised similar critiques about the lack of 
normative values presented by those in the law and economics space.49 
These critiques increased when the law and economics school 
eventually attempted to assert certain normative values by using 
market discipline.50 Gradually, these anticontractarian critics 
challenged the contractarians’ assumptions by using the contractarians’ 
own law and economics tools.51 Some assumptions were questioned on 
theoretical grounds;52 others were proven incorrect in practice.53  
Beginning in the 1980s, Cox joined the challenge to the rapid 
expansion of contractarianism and its underlying behavioral 
assumptions. In so doing, he provided new and innovative defenses of 
the belief that shareholders still needed protection by the mechanisms 
of corporation law. Here, we briefly outline some of his more 
important pieces from this period and explain their significance in the 
debates. 
1. Bias in the Boardroom.  In the pathbreaking article Bias in the 
Boardroom, Cox and his coauthor, Professor Harry Munsinger, draw 
on psychological research about insider bias to challenge the 
 
 47. Victor Brudney, The Role of the Board of Directors: The ALI and its Critics, 37 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 223, 235 (1983).  
 48. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, 
Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 439. 
 49. For an overview of these debates, see generally Symposium, The Debate on Contractual 
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). 
 50. See Johnston, supra note 28, at 241 (describing the values of the law and economics 
school). According to Johnston:  
[T]he explanatory power of the economic approach to corporate law . . . derives very 
largely from the fact that this approach is a theory of what competitive forces should 
eventually, in the long run, constrain rational economic actors to do. Under such an 
approach, the pattern of corporate governance structures which we observe at any 
point in time . . . are presumed to be efficient, equilibrium choices, because in the long 
run, only such choices will survive.  
Id. 
 51. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 583–84 (1992).  
 52. E.g., Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific 
Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 266–72 (1989); Mark V. Tushnet, Law, Science, and Law and 
Economics, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 51–52 (1997).  
 53. E.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1059 (1991) (noting that, contrary to what law and economics theorists 
hypothesized, in practice, veil piercing of limited-liability corporations occurred more regularly 
in contractual rather that tort settings). 
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contractarians’ rational-actor model of human behavior.54 They focus 
on a topic that Cox would repeatedly return to: the shareholder 
derivative action. The article begins by asking how much we can rely 
upon independent directors to monitor corporate management and 
each other.55 The widely accepted, economically oriented-Jensen and 
Meckling-monitoring model of the corporation had assumed that 
independent directors would do this, acting in shareholders’ best 
interests.56  
Drilling into this assumption, Cox and Munsinger questioned its 
accuracy. They offered “a psychological perspective on a specific 
application of the monitoring function: the independent directors’ 
assessment [of] whether the corporation’s interest is served by a 
derivative suit against their ‘insider’ colleagues.”57 In particular, the 
authors focused on independent directors’ ability to perceive and 
represent the corporation’s interests in evaluating a demand on the 
board or when serving on a special litigation committee (SLC). They 
concluded that “several psychological mechanisms can be expected to 
generate subtle, but powerful, biases which result in the independent 
directors’ reaching a decision insulating colleagues on the board from 
legal sanctions.”58  
The heart of the article lays out the psychological research related 
to in-group bias, which is especially problematic within the boardroom. 
The article focuses on uncertainty and director bias,59 social needs and 
director service,60 and self-validation and director bias.61 The authors 
apply these concepts to suggest that there is a strong bias in the 
 
 54. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations 
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985). 
 55. See id. at 84 (“We are interested in the independent directors’ ability to perceive and 
represent the corporate interest in evaluating a demand to the board or in serving on a special 
litigation committee.”). 
 56. See generally Michael Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE (Michael C. Jensen & Clifford H. Smith Jr. eds., 1984) (laying out the monitoring model 
of the corporation). In fairness, Eisenberg made almost the same assumption. See EISENBERG, 
supra note 13, at 174–77 (noting that independent directors had to be “independent in fact as well 
as in form”). 
 57. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 54, at 84. 
 58. Id. at 85. 
 59. Id. at 85–91. 
 60. Id. at 91–99. 
 61. Id. at 99–108. 
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boardroom against plaintiff shareholders and that even outside 
directors cannot be expected to operate impartially.62  
Bias in the Boardroom then connects its criticism of the academic 
theory to the problems with then-current doctrine by examining the 
analytical approaches for SLC reports offered by courts and the 
American Law Institute’s (ALI) Corporate Governance Project.63 It 
dissects the leading cases on the appropriate standard of judicial review 
for SLC reports and rejects each one.64 The authors advocated both for 
having court-appointed members of the SLC and for disallowing the 
committee’s recommendation whenever it “implicates a colleague of 
the directors, be that colleague a fellow director, control person, or a 
senior executive who associates on a regular basis with the directors.”65 
They conclude that SLC should be appointed by the court and should 
not include any of the defendants’ colleagues, past or present, or even 
those sharing a cultural identity with the defendants.66  
This key article was widely seen as offering a new and insightful 
critique of the use of SLCs and their impact on shareholder litigation.67 
By bringing the tools of psychology to bear, Cox and Munsinger offer 
insights that law and economics scholarship missed. Equally important, 
they provide a sophisticated critique of the view that market forces and 
existing corporate law sufficed in providing adequate shareholder 
protection.  
2. Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the 
“Chicago School.”  Nowhere is Cox’s resistance to contractarianism 
more apparent than in his article Insider Trading and Contracting: A 
Critical Response to the “Chicago School,” which directly tackles 
Chicago School arguments that favored legalizing insider trading.68 The 
article opens by criticizing the deficient grounds that the Supreme 
Court had previously offered for condemning insider trading as well as 
the theories that commentators had offered to fill its jurisprudential 
 
 62. Id. at 107. 
 63. See id. at 108–31. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. at 132.  
 66. Id. at 134.  
 67. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the 
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal 
Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 286 n.6 (2004) (arguing that SLCs are suspect for multiple reasons). 
 68. James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago 
School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628.  
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holes, such as the view that insider trading adversely affects the stock 
market’s allocative efficiency.69 Its main thrust, though, is a direct 
response to the Chicago School’s claims that insider trading should be 
permitted and that the law should allow corporations to license their 
officers and directors to engage in it.70  
Briefly, the Chicago School academics had argued that there was 
no empirical evidence that insider trading harms anyone.71 Cox 
counters that there was no empirical evidence that it is not harmful 
either and that, as the challengers to the status quo, the proponents of 
legalization should be required to make such a showing.72 A second 
argument for dropping the ban was that insider trading promotes 
stock-price adjustments.73 But, as Cox notes, insider trading is a much 
less efficient way to disclose information than regular corporate filings, 
and it could lead to disclosures that harm the corporation’s interest in 
withholding some confidential information to preserve its business 
advantages.74  
Chicago School scholars had further claimed that allowing insider 
trading would avoid periodic and wasteful negotiations between the 
company and managers over compensation by allowing managers to 
unilaterally reset their compensation.75 Cox has several responses to 
this claim, such as: What are the alternative ways for companies to sell 
their information?76 Will managers do this in a way that maximizes 
shareholder value?77 And will it encourage the creation of valuable 
information or just lead to self-dealing transactions?78  
Finally, the proponents of lifting the ban on insider trading argued 
that managers and stockholders would like to be able to contract for 
the right to participate in insider trading because that would benefit 
both sides.79 This claim’s validity turns on the shareholders’ ability to 
 
 69. See id. at 635–42. 
 70. See id. at 642–55. 
 71. Id. at 642. This view of insider trading was widespread. Among the classic works arguing 
for it were HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966), and Dennis 
W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).  
 72. Cox, supra note 68, at 644. 
 73. Id. at 645–48. 
 74. Id. at 648. 
 75. Id. at 649–53. 
 76. Id. at 650–51. 
 77. Id. at 651. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 653–55. 
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contract efficiently given their information disadvantage. Cox points 
out that it is difficult for shareholders to estimate the costs and benefits 
of insider trading, especially in public companies.80 In addition, 
corporations have several interests that would be affected by allowing 
insider trading, including the need to understand the executives’ 
motives and compensation sources, the need for full information to 
assess the executives’ stewardship, and the shareholders’ desire that 
executives concentrate on the welfare of the company rather than their 
private investment agenda.81 
3. Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for 
Derivative Suit Procedures.  Cox returned to shareholder litigation in 
his article Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for 
Derivative Suit Procedures, which delves into the purpose of the 
derivative suit.82 Deterrence and compensation are often mentioned as 
the twin goals of derivative litigation, but sometimes, as Cox notes, 
these goals are in conflict.83 When they do conflict, he asks, how should 
the conflict be resolved?  
Initially, Cox attacks the contractarians’ view that derivative suits 
are unnecessary because market forces are sufficient to police 
management wrongdoing. He deploys economic analysis to argue that 
this view is incorrect for several reasons. First, market monitoring only 
prevents extreme deviations, and the law should impose fiduciary 
obligations to establish the parameters of mutually acceptable 
conduct.84 Second, although portfolio theory suggests that holding a 
diversified group of stocks eliminates unsystemic risks, managerial-
misconduct levels are a form of systemic risk that can be lowered by 
the deterrence value of derivative suits.85 Finally, he contends that the 
market for corporate control is inadequate because there must be 
massive misconduct to appreciably drive down the stock price, and 
most of the time, managerial misconduct is only a “one shot” breach of 
fiduciary duties.86 
 
 80. Id. at 654. 
 81. Id. at 658–59. 
 82. James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative 
Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984). 
 83. Id. at 746. 
 84. Id. at 748. 
 85. Id. at 752.  
 86. Id. at 753. 
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After he establishes the necessity of derivative suits, Cox 
addresses limitations on these cases that spring from concerns that such 
suits would lessen shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers or 
impose liability on directors who engage in legitimate risk-taking 
activities. Here, Cox argues that shareholder monitoring is only 
economical to a point and that the derivative suit’s enforcement of 
fiduciary duties is necessary to deter managerial misconduct.87 
Furthermore, it does not inhibit risk-taking if courts treat duty-of-care 
claims as seriously as duty-of-loyalty claims even though the latter are 
more frequently upheld.88 Because the two sets of issues are often 
intertwined, and even though the duty of care is only violated in 
egregious cases, the duty of care is a minimal standard of legal 
performance.89  
Cox argues that courts had overemphasized compensation as a 
goal for derivative actions, in some cases allowing it to eclipse 
deterrence altogether. For example, courts dismissed cases in which 
there was no corporate injury—even if they involved knowing criminal 
violations—because the corporation benefited from the managers’ 
actions.90 Cox argues that courts should consider the deterrence 
benefits from chastening managers by allowing a modest recovery or 
by ordering corporate-governance changes that would prevent a 
reoccurrence, even in cases in which no injury can be shown.91  
Yet the balance can also tip the other way. Cox argues that, in the 
ALI’s then-proposed Principles of Corporate Governance, Drafts 1–3, 
there was too strong a preference for deterrence as a goal for the 
derivative suit instead of compensation.92 This had the adverse effect 
of ignoring important compensatory issues that derivative suits should 
also address.93 
4. The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits.  Although Cox 
maintained his scholarly focus on corporate and securities law issues, 
his wide-ranging response to law and economics led him to draw on 
economics and psychology and eventually emerging scholarship 
around social meaning and social norms. In The Social Meaning of 
 
 87. Id. at 758. 
 88. Id. at 760–61. 
 89. Id. at 761–63. 
 90. Id. at 765 n.97. 
 91. Id. at 775–76. 
 92. Id. at 777–79. 
 93. Id. at 777. 
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Shareholder Suits, Cox examines the public image of shareholder 
lawsuits, their “expressive value,” to determine if there are particular 
characteristics of class actions and derivative suits that enhance or 
detract from people perceiving them as a positive social force. 94 The 
public image of these suits is critical because it determines whether 
managers will change their behavior if there is a threat of being a 
defendant in shareholder litigation.95 Cox uses Professor Lawrence 
Lessig’s techniques for constructing social meaning to determine which 
features of shareholder litigation are consistent with the process of 
establishing business-organization norms.96 
Here, Cox again considers the interaction between deterrence and 
compensation as goals in shareholder suits. He concluded that 
compensation is the “prevailing objective of shareholder suits” with 
“deterrence [as] its valuable byproduct.”97 He argues that this 
hierarchy of goals dilutes the social meaning of shareholder suits 
because compensation is a private matter whereas deterrence is a 
public good.98 Emphasizing compensation muddies the suits’ 
expression of social values, he claims, weakening the public perception 
that shareholder suits reflect society’s condemnation of the 
misconduct.99 Settlements similarly emphasize the private nature of 
shareholder suits by breaking those suits’ link to the state and speaking 
to the proportionality of the consideration supporting the contract 
instead of admonishing the company for violating laws and social 
norms.100 
Such framing—placing an emphasis on suits’ compensatory 
function—may adversely affect one’s image of the suit because leading 
academics and other lawyers evaluate the suits’ success by whether 
they result in proper compensation for injured parties.101 Because suits 
tend to yield low-percentage recoveries for shareholders, they are 
assessed by many as a failure.102 This perception of failure is 
compounded by the fact that Directors and Officers’ (D&O) insurance 
 
 94. James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3 (1999). 
 95. Id. at 5. 
 96. Id. at 7–8 (citing Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
943 (1995)).  
 97. Id. at 8. 
 98. Id. at 11. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 11–12.  
 101. Id. at 13. 
 102. Id. at 14–16. 
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carriers pay all settlement amounts, so individual managers and 
directors do not contribute any personal funds for wrongdoing. This 
tendency to overemphasize compensation is exacerbated by the fact 
that deterrence is not easily measureable in economic figures, so it is 
not heavily weighed.  
There are ways to change the social meaning of lawsuits. Cox 
points out that strong pretrial procedures can help create a positive 
impression of shareholder suits. For example, the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) had such an effect by adding 
stricter pleading requirements and a discovery bar for securities-fraud 
class actions, which helped ensure that stronger suits were filed.103 In 
contrast, D&O insurance coverage does little to burnish the suits’ 
social meaning. Even though D&O policies have exclusions for 
intentional misconduct, shareholder suits almost always settle within 
the amounts of the D&O insurance coverage without any contribution 
by individual defendants. 
Finally, the use of certain rituals may reinforce the positive social 
meaning of shareholder suits. For instance, under the terms of the 
PSLRA’s “lead plaintiff” provision, courts appoint the lead plaintiff, 
creating an “important public connection” that also reinforces “the 
legitimacy of the suit[].”104 With derivative suits, however, no such 
process existed at the time The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits 
was published (although it has since become more prevalent in 
Delaware105), and the court engaged in the demand-requirement 
inquiry. Settlements in these cases are also problematic in light of social 
meaning: they are lawyer and insurance driven and “do not reflect the 
broader private interest of the class or corporation or . . . the public 
objective of deterrence.”106  
So what can be done to improve the social image of the 
shareholder suit? First, as Cox suggests, shareholder suits should 
explicitly elevate the goal of deterrence over that of compensation and 
call on individual defendants to make contributions to the settlement 
to increase the suit’s deterrence value.107 Second, they should 
 
 103.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 104. Id. at 29.  
 105. See generally Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative 
Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753 
(2012) (detailing Delaware’s increased popularity as a forum for shareholder litigation).  
 106. Cox, supra note 94, at 34. 
 107. See id. at 39–40. 
THOMAS & WELLS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2016 11:16 AM 
484  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:467 
reinvigorate the adequacy-of-the-plaintiff requirement in derivative 
suits to make it more like the PSLRA lead-plaintiff determination and 
provide standing for nonintervenors to object to the settlement and to 
appeal.108 Finally, Cox condemns the corrupting influence of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Epstein,109 which promoted forum shopping by defense firms and 
“weaken[ed] the ritual of settlement.”110 
II. NEW DIRECTIONS 
By the end of the 1990s, the battle over contractarianism had 
stalemated. Law and economics had, it appeared, become almost 
universally accepted as the central tool for corporate law. But the 
nexus-of-contracts model of the corporation—and its implicit 
devaluation of shareholder protection as a central goal of corporate 
law—had not won over all of its opponents.111 Economic analysis, many 
concluded, could serve as a tool to justify legal conclusions but could 
not, on its own, definitively answer policy questions surrounding 
corporate accountability and governance.112 What intellectual 
coherence could be found formed instead around a set of less sweeping 
assumptions about corporate law and governance: that boards serve as 
monitors instead of managers,113 that investors and boards contract for 
certain expectations of protection subject to market-based and 
regulatory frictions,114 and that those protections have normative 
decisions attached to them beyond pure profit-seeking motives.115  
Quite possibly, changes in the corporate economy over the 
previous two decades had undermined scholars’ faith in a single 
narrative for corporate law, while redirecting scholarly attention 
toward specific developments and the construction of empirical tools 
to better understand them. For instance, shifts in the nature of 
corporate shareholding led to the reconsideration of once-bedrock 
assumptions about shareholder powerlessness. Shareholders 
 
 108. See id. at 41–44. 
 109. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996). 
 110. Cox, supra note 94, at 38 (citing Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 373); see also Thomas & 
Thompson, supra note 105, at 1766–67, 1770 (pointing out how Matsushita “stimulated 
multijurisdictional litigation filings” and led to reverse auctions by defense law firms). 
 111. CHEFFINS, supra note 1, at 29. 
 112. See Bratton, supra note 42, at 193–97. 
 113. See id. at 186 n.37.  
 114. See id. at 180, 186–90. 
 115. See id. at 212. 
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increasingly came in “many sizes and shapes,”116 and as a result, older 
models of shareholder behavior that presumed diffuse ownership 
rapidly lost validity.117 Similarly, questions reemerged about the value 
of shareholder primacy and its economic desirability.118 New criticisms 
also appeared about the presumption that boards behaved rationally 
to maximize shareholder value119 and about the processes by which 
firms determined their organizational boundaries.120 All the while, new 
intellectual developments threw into doubt the economic theories 
underlying much of this legal analysis as behavioral economics 
emerged from classical microeconomic modeling as a distinct school of 
thought.121  
These developments may explain why Cox’s interests and most 
significant publications moved toward closer studies of new 
developments in the corporate governance system. In the late 1990s, 
his attention was drawn to questions such as how globalization and 
technological change challenged shareholder protections,122 how 
gatekeepers like the accounting profession could perform their roles in 
the aftermath of corporate scandals,123 and how the new tools of 
empirical legal research could be deployed to answer pressing 
questions in corporate law.124 
 
 116. Jack B. Jacobs, Some Legal and Policy Implications of the New Shareholder Paradigm, 
22 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar./Apr. 2014, at 1, 2. 
 117. Id. See generally Leo. E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the 
Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002) (advocating for corporate law 
judges to adapt to changing understandings of the business world). 
 118. Zhong Xing Tan, Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders: Re-
conceptualizing the Means and Ends of Anglo-American Corporate Governance in the Wake of 
the Global Financial Crisis, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 169, 173–79 (2014). 
 119. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role 
of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 406 (2001). 
 120. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 
110 YALE L.J. 387, 391–93 (2000). 
 121. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 442 (Claire A. Hill & Brett 
H. McDonald eds., 2012) (explaining how behavioral economics and psychology can be applied 
to understanding corporate law structures). 
 122. See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Fundamentals of an Electronic-Based Federal Securities Act, 
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 857, 873–75 (1997); James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities 
Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1244–52 (1999) [hereinafter Cox, Regulatory Duopoly]. 
 123. See infra Part II.A. 
 124. See infra Part II.B. 
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A. Standards and Gatekeepers 
Some of Cox’s most insightful and prescient writings during this 
period focused on accounting—long an area of particular expertise for 
him125—as he examined both the growing battle over U.S. 
corporations’ accounting standards and the changing nature of the 
accounting profession in the United States. Starting in the late 1990s, 
Cox wrote a series of key articles on the evolution of accounting 
standards and the accounting profession, examining the challenges that 
each posed to the U.S. securities markets and corporate governance 
systems. This Section highlights three of his best-known pieces that 
responded to globalization, regulatory competition, and financial 
collapses, each implicating the role of accounting standards and the 
accounting profession.  
1. Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets.  Cox opens his 
1999 article Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets by 
observing that globalization and technological advances had 
“nurture[d] an environment of regulatory competition among 
nations.” He then focuses his attention on recent debates over whether 
the SEC should allow issuers to reconcile their financial statements 
using International Accounting Standards (IAS) instead of the U.S.-
generated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).126 
Although giving due weight to the technical differences between the 
standards, Cox uses the issue to engage with larger questions about the 
dubious benefits promised by regulatory competition.  
The article situates the specific standards under consideration in 
their larger institutional and cultural contexts. GAAP was developed 
by the Financial Standards Accounting Board (FASB), a robust U.S. 
organization significantly insulated from government and private 
sector pressures that possesses notable expertise. The International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), overseer of IAS (and later 
IAS’s successor, the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS)), lacked these qualities.127 Thus, the decision to allow U.S. 
 
 125. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (1980). 
 126. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 122, at 1201. For descriptions of the ongoing 
attempt to import international accounting standards, see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
The SEC’s Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1 (2008); Martin Gelter & Zehra G. Kavame Eroglu, Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics of 
Resistance Against IFRS, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 89 (2014). 
 127. See Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 122, at 1206–08.  
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issuers to adopt IAS involved not just a choice between two standards 
but between two organizational frameworks. This change would 
require the SEC, assuming the SEC wanted to maintain its dominant 
role in regulating U.S. markets, to “assure itself that the IASC has a 
governance structure and operating processes sufficient to assure it can 
continually establish high-quality financial reporting standards,”128 and 
it would also require the SEC to evaluate other nations’ accounting 
cultures to decide whether they sufficiently tracked those of the United 
States.129 There may, Cox concedes, be benefits from the SEC allowing 
U.S. issuers to use IAS: issuers could for instance benefit if cross-listing 
in foreign markets reduced their cost of capital.130 But it is difficult to 
determine if those benefits outweighed the costs.131 
Cox then deepens his focus by taking on advocates for regulatory 
competition in securities markets. Here he continues his fight against a 
knee-jerk adoption of the contractarian approach. In particular, Cox 
challenges arguments in favor of allowing accounting standards to be 
set by an issuer’s domicile or allowing an issuer to choose any regime’s 
disclosure requirements.132 He argues that “[u]nderlying each of these 
proposals is the belief that regulatory competition . . . is more likely to 
result in disclosure standards that are optimal for investors and 
issuers.”133 Cox points out the many flaws to these arguments: there are 
not many competing regulators, there is not perfect information that 
discounting between different jurisdictions based on jurisdiction-
specific disclosure requirements actually occurs, and there may be 
staggering enforcement difficulties if corporations could indeed choose 
which standard to follow.134 In contrast, he contends, that there are 
benefits to be derived from a single or lead standard-setter, such as the 
SEC, developing and overseeing these standards.135  
In the end, although Cox rejects more radical arguments for 
regulatory competition, he acknowledges that there is still a lack of 
“hard evidence bearing on the intrinsic merits of the exclusivity of U.S. 
GAAP.”136 Given the political pressures placed on the SEC at that 
 
 128. Id. at 1210. 
 129. See id. at 1211. 
 130. See id. at 1219–21. 
 131. See id. at 1219–23. 
 132. See id. at 1229–33. 
 133. Id. at 1230. 
 134. Id. at 1232–33, 1239.  
 135. See id. at 1237–44. 
 136. Id. at 1244. 
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time, it seemed that the adoption of IAS was inevitable.137 The SEC’s 
best approach, he concludes, was to take an active role in overseeing 
measured acceptance of IAS: “Experience gained by the SEC’s 
incremental embrace of IAS . . . will surely provide experience that the 
SEC can apply when considering foreign-based disclosure standards in 
the future.”138 In sum, Cox doubts the value of the IAS but saw its 
adoption as unavoidable, so he charted a path forward that leaves a 
strong role for the SEC to maintain its oversight of public companies.139 
Cox’s focus on the SEC’s important role as overseer of accounting 
standards leads him into a careful analysis of the accounting profession 
itself.140 His analysis became urgent with the bursting of the Internet 
bubble in 2000 and the series of corporate scandals that began with 
Enron in 2001, events in which the accounting profession played a 
major role.  
2. Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and 
the Metrics for Accounting Measurements.  After the corporate 
debacles of 2000–2002, widespread criticism was leveled at the 
accounting profession for allowing the disasters to occur. In his article 
Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the 
Metrics for Accounting Measurements, Cox surveys a number of 
responses to this crisis, from calls for principles-based accounting to the 
various reforms bundled together in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(Sarbanes-Oxley). But he asks whether more basic features of 
accounting relationships contributed to accounting’s apparent failure 
and what changes might be needed to restore investors’ faith in public 
companies.141 
For Cox, the underlying problem in the accounting profession is 
that too many of its members are willing to abandon their public- 
overseer role and compromise their independence to help clients.142 
Like other observers, he blames the erosion of independence in large 
part on the growing importance of nonaudit services for accounting 
 
 137. Id. at 1247. This adoption did not ultimately happen, due in part to the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis.  
 138. Id. at 1252. 
 139. Id. at 1244–50. 
 140. Id. at 1228–52.  
 141. James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the 
Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (2003). 
 142. See id. at 308–10.  
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firms.143 In 1976, “audit fees constituted [70] percent of accounting firm 
revenues; by 1998 audit fees had fallen to [31] percent of their 
revenues.”144 Why this eroded independence was unclear: perhaps 
accounting firms treat accounting fees as “loss leader[s]”145 to enter 
more competitive consulting fields, or perhaps management uses the 
threat of lost consulting fees to obtain more favorable treatment from 
auditors.146 Whatever the mechanism, accountants’ professional 
judgment appears compromised by the changing nature of their firms’ 
businesses.147 
What to do? Cox refuses to blame the rule-oriented nature of 
GAAP for the problem. Some had claimed that this approach made it 
“too easy for the accountant to rationalize that if a specific treatment 
is not prohibited, then it must be permissible.”148 If anything, Cox 
points out, accounting trickery would be easier under an approach that 
abandoned rules in favor of broad principles that gave auditors greater 
discretion as to how to apply them.149 Furthermore, current law already 
incorporated elements identified with a principles-based approach. A 
leading case, for example, required disclosures to provide a “fair 
presentation of the company’s assets, liabilities, revenues, and 
expenses.”150 And this approach was reinforced in Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
“strengthened requirements of the audit committee and the executive 
certifications [intended] to drive reporting toward principles, or at least 
a single principle, of fair presentation, and away from a more technical 
orientation toward rules.”151  
The reference to Sarbanes-Oxley points to a different approach 
that was embodied in its provisions, strengthening the audit committee 
and “anchor[ing] the accountant’s relationship in the audit committee 
and not in management.”152 To this end, Sarbanes-Oxley tightens the 
 
 143. See id. at 309–10.  
 144. Id. at 310. 
 145. Id. at 312. 
 146. Id. at 313. 
 147. Id. at 314. Cox noted that (at least in 2002) there was no “solid empirical support that 
nonaudit services . . . systematically compromise[d] the quality of the outside accountant’s audit.” 
Id. at 313. It would be foolish, however, to ignore the intuitions and less systematic evidence that 
such influence occurred. Id. at 314–15.  
 148. Id. at 303. 
 149. Id. at 309. 
 150. Id. at 320 (citing United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 1006 (1970)).  
 151. Id. at 321. 
 152. Id. at 307. 
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definition of independence for audit committee members, creates 
strong pressure to make one member a “financial expert,”153 empowers 
the committee to engage its own independent experts, and—crucial in 
Cox’s view—“impose[s] a dialogue between the audit committee and 
the outside accountants.” 154  
Yet even this is not enough, and here we see again Cox’s sensitivity 
to the larger contexts within which laws and rules operate. For all the 
legal changes made, “there is good cause for concern that the culture 
of accounting has not yet moved forward to reflect these changes.”155 
The auditor’s independence requires the auditor to operate 
independently from management, and yet there was little evidence of 
this. Hence the article’s closing, in which Cox calls for the new Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to reinvigorate 
accounting’s social role and “foster[] an environment for auditors to 
perform their vocation as professionals.”156 In this way, the new body 
would have a “significant contribution to making audit committees 
effective guardians of stockholders’ interests.” 157 
3. The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The U.S. Accounting Profession.  
In the book chapter The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The U.S. Accounting 
Profession, written a few years after the previous article, Cox returns 
to the problems with the accounting industry, focusing on how its 
structure helped cause the industry’s transformation “from a 
profession to a business” and asking what further reforms could 
mitigate still-existing problems within the field.158 He begins with 
startling facts driving home the existence of a “tight oligopoly” in 
accounting: accounting is now so concentrated that, at the time the 
chapter was written, the “Big Four” firms performed 97 percent of all 
public-company audits for companies with sales over $250 million. In 
some industries, accounting was effectively dominated by a single 
firm.159 Despite this contention, there was little evidence that the Big 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 308. 
 155. Id. at 323. 
 156. Id. at 327. 
 157. Id. 
 158. James D. Cox, The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The US Accounting Profession, in AFTER 
ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION IN 
EUROPE AND THE US 294, 296 (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2006).  
 159. Id. at 297, 298 (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-864, PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 16 (2003)). 
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Four had colluded to raise prices for accounting work, likely due to 
obstacles to collusion including a lack of transparency in accounting 
fees, which makes monitoring any kind of explicit or implicit 
agreement tough, and a lack of an effective means for punishing 
defectors from an explicit or implicit agreement.160  
But, strangely enough, neither is there any evidence of vigorous 
competition in the accounting field—what competition that does occur 
between big accounting firms is for nonaudit services.161 Accounting 
firms had apparently concluded that “profits could better be obtained 
through expanding their consulting operations than to expend efforts 
to wrest audit clients from their competitors.”162 For Cox, this lack of 
competition is particularly harmful to investors. Financial theory 
predicts that in such a concentrated industry an accounting firm would 
seek a competitive edge by offering “superior” accounting services to 
clients and foreswearing nonaudit services. It also predicts that public 
companies eager to impress capital markets with the stringency of their 
financial statements would hire these independent accounting firms. 
This prediction has not come true, in large part because of the 
attractiveness of charging consulting (nonaudit) fees: Each firm 
“pursued the same parallel behavior of leveraging their audit 
relationship to expand their profits through the rapid growth of 
consulting. . . . [E]ach firm’s pursuit of this parallel strategy was made 
possible by the industry’s concentration.”163 What results is today’s 
unsatisfactory situation, in which audits are dominated by the Big Four, 
but each firm is reliant on nonaudit fees that reduce their independence 
and the reliability of their attestations. Industry structure, not greed 
alone, produces this problematic situation. 
Sarbanes-Oxley improved what came before it, but it left the basic 
industry structure in place. And such reforms as were adopted had 
begun eroding by the time this chapter appeared in 2006, as evidenced 
by Congress’s intervention to block proposals that would have 
required the expensing of stock options and the SEC’s approval of 
amendments to disclosure requirements that obscured the distinction 
between some audit and nonaudit fees.164  
 
For example, “76.4 per cent of total assets of the petroleum and coal products industry were 
audited by Pricewaterhouse Coopers.” Id. at 298.  
 160. Id. at 301–03. 
 161. See id. at 307–08. 
 162. Id. at 308. 
 163. Id. at 316. 
 164. See id. at 328. 
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Cox concludes the piece with several proposals designed to 
ameliorate this problem, such as increased, more accurate disclosure of 
audit and nonaudit payments—which would give the market a better 
sense of the auditor’s dependence on the client165—and requiring 8-K 
reporting when a client terminates an auditor’s nonaudit consulting 
relationship—which may cast a harsh light on management’s 
manipulation of the nonaudit fees.166 The availability of PCAOB 
reports on auditors may also improve the situation, allowing audit 
committees to measure the quality of auditors.167 Most radically, Cox 
proposes mandatory periodic rotation of auditors, a move that might 
finally shake up this oligopoly and reignite competition in the field.168  
4. Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-
Year-Old SEC.  Cox also kept an eye on the larger currents of 
globalization and technological change that were transforming U.S. 
securities markets and asked how the SEC should respond. Cast in 
broader terms, he asks: “[C]an an agency created and operating 
through most of its years in the internationally insulated environment 
of U.S. capital markets survive in a world without borders[?]”169 As he 
had done before, he focuses on accounting standards, particularly the 
recent SEC decision to allow foreign issuers to reconcile their financial 
reports to IFRS rather than GAAP.170 But his real goal is to reveal how 
“globalization forces us to rethink the ultimate role of securities 
regulation in an environment of global trading and offerings.”171 The 
article also offers Cox another opportunity to challenge opponents of 
mandatory disclosure.  
The SEC’s limited acceptance of the IFRS seemed to portend that 
it would soon allow all issuers—from the United States or  
otherwise—to choose which standard to adhere to (a development 
 
 165. See id. at 332 (recommending “enhanced disclosure of those relationships” that “might 
compromise the accountant’s independence”). 
 166. See id.  
 167. See id. at 336. 
 168. See id. at 335 (“[I]f all firms were required to rotate auditors every ten years . . . the 
number of changes in any single year would be roughly double the number that occurred in 2003. 
Such rotation can be expected to lead to much less concentration within industries.”). 
 169. James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year-Old 
SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 941 (2009). 
 170. Id. at 943–44, 946–51. 
 171. Id. at 946. 
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subsequently derailed by the 2008 financial crisis).172 In challenging 
this, Cox returns to first principles and argues that there are “four well-
recognized interrelated objectives sought to be achieved by mandatory 
disclosure requirements”173: to provide investors with sufficient 
information to make informed, intelligent investment choices; to 
enhance the allocational efficiency of securities markets; to reduce 
fraudulent offerings and manipulation; and to “empower[] 
stockholders vis-à-vis the firm’s managers and restrain[] opportunistic 
behavior by company managers.”174 Given the weaknesses of the 
IFRS—their lack of precision, their deference to management, and 
their openness to political manipulation—only the first objective would 
be satisfied under mutual recognition of both standards; the other three 
would be harmed. Nor would investors be able to mitigate the risks of 
fraudulent offerings through a properly diversified portfolio.175  
Yet it does not seem possible to return to a world in which all 
issuers touching U.S. markets are required to adhere to GAAP 
because the forces of globalization are so powerful that “each country’s 
securities regulations regime [cannot act as] an island unto itself.”176 In 
the global marketplace, Cox counsels, the best approach is for the SEC 
to engage with foreign regulators and authorities to raise standards 
around the globe through “engagement, persuasion, and 
perseverance,”177 developing capacities to evaluate proposed foreign 
standards in the process. Neither isolationism nor heedless acceptance 
of competing standards would serve the American investor.  
B. Empirical Research Comes to the Fore in the Legal Academy  
Cox’s scholarship over the past forty years displays remarkable 
range, flexibility, and curiosity. Most recently, he has engaged with 
what some see as the most exciting development in current corporate 
 
 172. Emily Chasan, SEC’s New Strategic Plan Backs Away from IFRS, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 
4, 2014, 1:37 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2014/02/04/secs-new-strategic-plan-backs-away-from-
ifrs [https://perma.cc/FP5T-THHS]. 
 173. Cox, supra note 169, at 959.  
 174. Id. at 961. 
 175. See id. at 969 (demonstrating that the risk of purchasing a fraudulent offering “is 
systematic so that it cannot be diversified away; the larger and more diverse one’s portfolio, the 
closer the portfolio’s overall risk . . . will be to the risk of fraud in the market as a whole”). 
 176. Id. at 983. 
 177. Id. at 985. 
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legal scholarship: empirical legal studies.178 Cox (in conjunction with 
one of the authors of this Article) has played a significant role in this 
new scholarship, writing extensively about the empirical dimensions of 
private and public enforcement of the federal securities laws and 
showing the value of how lawyers analyze problems. His work in this 
area shows a continued focus on the key role that shareholders play in 
modern corporate governance, combining careful doctrinal and 
theoretical analysis with the tools of modern econometrics to reinforce 
his arguments. 
1. Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence 
and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to 
Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements.  In his widely cited 
article Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence 
and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to 
Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements,179 Cox and one of the 
authors of this Article document that many institutional investors, 
perhaps as much as 70 percent, do not file claims to recover damages 
that they are entitled to receive in settlements of securities class 
actions.180 For those institutions that do file settlement claims, their 
“average recovery rates are about one-third of losses” and the dollar 
amounts of their mean and median recoveries are “substantial.”181  
The reasons why these investors leave significant amounts of 
money on the table are numerous. First, some institutional investors 
accord a low priority to filing claims because they do business with 
some of the settling companies and do not wish to ruffle their 
feathers.182 Second, a lot of time passes between the commission of the 
fraud, the filing of the suit, the final settlement, and the disbursement 
 
 178. See generally Randall S. Thomas, The Increasing Role of Empirical Research in Corporate 
Law Scholarship, 92 GEO. L.J. 981 (2004) (defending an analytic approach to corporate law that 
withstands rigorous testing while capturing the broad influences of politics and economics). 
 179. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: 
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in 
Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, 
Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers]. A pilot version of this study was published earlier. 
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail 
to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (2002).  
 180. Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers, supra note 179, at 425. 
 181. Id. at 424–25. 
 182. Id. at 425–29. 
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of money.183 During that period, institutions may change advisors or 
custodian banks and the claims and supporting documentation may get 
lost.184 Third, institutions and advisors worry about their trading profits 
a lot, and they fret about their returns from filing claims very little. 
After all, they are evaluated on the trading profits, not the returns from 
filing claims.185 Fourth, the company thinks that their custodian is filing 
the claims while the custodian thinks the company is doing it, so neither 
checks the other.186  
These observations are supported by two surveys of institutional 
investors about their practices.187 According to these surveys, 
institutions largely rely on custodian banks to handle the filing of their 
claims and hardly monitor the filing themselves.188 Custodians do not 
charge separate fees for filing claims and therefore have little incentive 
to do much work on them. Furthermore, the liability rules that apply 
in this area for failing to file claims are weak: only abject failure to file 
or monitor in the face of bad news is enough to establish liability for 
institutional investors.189 Custodians can face contractual liability for 
breaching any claim-filing obligation, but, again, institutions do not 
actively monitor them.190  
Having established the problem, Cox offers some policy 
recommendations to deal with it. First, he proposes that the courts 
establish a central clearinghouse for information about settlements and 
claims.191 They should also standardize claim-filing documentation and 
 
 183. See id. at 429 (estimating that “four years or more can elapse between the date of a trade 
that occurred during the front end of the class action period and the publication of notice of a 
settlement”). 
 184. See id. (stating that “institutions and their advisors . . . change their custodian banks” 
frequently, and that the “departing investment advisor or custodian bank does not customarily 
forward to the institution, or its successors, the trading records for the portfolio it had previously 
handled”). 
 185. Cf. id. at 431 (suggesting that institutional “managers who view their objective as being 
well-performing traders” do “not value submitting claims because the expected gains of doing so” 
are typically “dwarfed by both the size of the fund’s assets and the average yearly returns by the 
fund”). 
 186. See id. at 432. 
 187. See id. at 432–38. 
 188. See id. at 445. 
 189. See id. at 441 (“[U]nless a fund was aware that its custodian was performing its claims 
filing duties badly and the fund’s trustees consciously decided to do nothing about it, the current 
practice would likely be sufficient to protect fund trustees from liability.”). 
 190. See id. at 442, 445. 
 191. Id. at 446.  
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forms.192 Institutional investors need to monitor their custodians’ 
claim-filing practices. Finally, the SEC should improve institutional 
investors’ 13F filing requirements and make this data more easily 
available.193  
More generally, Cox discusses the allocation rules that institutions 
use for distributing proceeds that they collect.194 He shows that the 
proceeds do not directly benefit the beneficiaries that lost money, but 
rather they usually go into the institution’s general funds for the benefit 
of all plan beneficiaries. This means that the losers from securities 
fraud are not fully compensated for their losses. From a theoretical 
perspective, these findings constitute an argument against justifying 
securities class actions on the basis of compensation. Instead, 
justifications should focus more on the class actions’ deterrence value. 
This consideration reflects the earlier theme found in much of his work 
on derivative suits: representative suits are best understood and 
evaluated in terms of deterrence and not compensation. 
2. Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead 
Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions.  The PSLRA195 was passed by the 
U.S. Congress in 1995 and had a dramatic impact on private-securities-
fraud class actions.196 One of its most innovative provisions was the 
lead-plaintiff provision,197 which created a rebuttable presumption that 
the shareholder with the largest financial interest should be the named 
plaintiff in securities fraud class actions.198 The theory was that large 
institutional investors would have the best financial incentives to 
monitor the plaintiffs’ attorneys who file these class actions. The hope 
was that the institutional investors would negotiate lower fees, 
supervise the filing of suits and litigation documents, and monitor class 
counsel.  
Institutional investors, however, were slow to answer the call to 
arms. It turned out that becoming a lead plaintiff imposed significant 
 
 192. Id. at 445. 
 193. Id. at 446–48. 
 194. Id. at 449–53. 
 195. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 196. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical 
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1588 (2006). 
 197. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3) (2012). 
 198. Cox & Thomas, supra note 196, at 1588–89.  
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costs on institutions.199 These costs included discovery into the 
institution’s business practices; the time needed to manage the 
litigation, which was often uncompensated; the risk of disclosing 
proprietary business information through discovery; and the threat of 
suit by other plaintiffs who were disappointed at not being appointed 
lead plaintiff.200 The institution would also face significant opportunity 
costs as it was forced to give up the option of pursuing an individual 
recovery.201 
In the article Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of 
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, Cox and one of the authors 
of this Article assess the impact of the lead-plaintiff provision, finding 
that the presence of an institutional investor as the lead plaintiff leads 
to a higher recovery for defrauded shareholders.202 The empirical 
analysis also documents that courts prefer to select institutional 
investors in the lead-plaintiff beauty contests. Lead plaintiffs choose 
the biggest cases to seek appointment as lead plaintiffs, and the 
percentage of losses recovered in securities class actions seemingly 
declined after the passage of the PSLRA.203 
Although most of these findings support Congress’s decision to 
enact the lead-plaintiff provision, Cox sees room for improvement. He 
suggests that courts should allow reimbursement of all the institutions’ 
expenses for being a lead plaintiff and ignore the statutory restrictions 
on the number of cases in which a prominent institutional investors can 
act as lead plaintiff.204  
3. The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s 
Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority.  Cox’s embrace of economic 
and empirical approaches does not signal an abandonment of more 
traditional tools of legal analysis. In The Emperor Has No Clothes: 
Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking 
 
 199. See id. at 1602–10 (discussing the costs of serving as lead plaintiff). 
 200. See id. at 1602. 
 201. Id. at 1604–05. 
 202. Id. at 1630–34. A related article is James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There 
Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action 
Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355 (2008).  
 203. Id. at 1619–27, 1627 tbl.8.  
 204. Cox & Thomas, supra note 196, at 1637 (“[C]ourts should be more willing, indeed 
activist, in awarding costs to institutional lead plaintiffs for all expenses related to an institution’s 
participation as a lead plaintiff.”); id. at 1638 (“Furthermore, we believe courts generally should 
follow the lead of the few judges that have been willing, in the right circumstances, to excuse the 
‘professional plaintiff’ restrictions of the PSLRA.”). 
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Authority, Cox and Professor Benjamin Baucom analyze205 the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC,206 which invalidated 
the SEC’s recently adopted Rule 14a-11.207 This rule provided certain 
shareholders access to a corporation’s proxy so that they could 
nominate their own candidates for director positions.208 In this article, 
Cox and Baucom challenge both the decision that struck down the rule 
and the court’s new approach to regulations that promised to strangle 
much SEC rulemaking.  
In Business Roundtable, the court insisted that the SEC was 
required to apply a cost-benefit analysis to justify the proposed 
regulation.209 Here, Cox and Baucom closely examine the relevant 
legislative history before concluding that the court applied a level of 
judicial review inconsistent with what Congress had mandated in the 
securities acts.210 They then offer a new approach to justify the 
adoption of regulations that would allow future SEC rulemaking to 
better fit the more exacting scrutiny that new rules will seemingly have 
to survive.  
According to Cox and Baucom, the main flaw in the D.C. Circuit’s 
analysis is its conclusion that the SEC, in adopting Rule 14a-11, was 
required to produce “an accurate cost-benefit determination” and 
failed to do so.211 For most of its history, the SEC merely had to 
determine whether a rule was “in the public interest” and would 
further “the protection of investors.”212 In 1996, however, the National 
Market Securities Improvement Act (NMSIA)213 added a requirement 
 
 205. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the 
D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012). 
 206. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 207. Id. at 1156. 
 208. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,677 (Sept. 16, 
2010) (amending 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249), invalidated by Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 
F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 209. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49 (holding that the SEC’s “failure to ‘apprise 
itself . . . of the economic consequences of a proposed regulation’ makes promulgation of the rule 
arbitrary and capricious” (citing Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 
2005))).  
 210. Cox & Baucom, supra note 205, at 1818–21 (concluding that the “triple considerations of 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation” in the statute are subordinate to the SEC’s 
primary goal of investor protection (citing the review standard set out in Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012))).  
 211. Id. at 1813. 
 212. Id. at 1818 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b)).  
 213. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 
3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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that the SEC also consider whether a proposed rule “promote[s] 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”214 The legislative 
history of the NMSIA shows, though, that Congress did not intend to 
require a rule always be found to promote “efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation,” nor did Congress intend to mandate cost-
benefit analysis for every rule.215 Legislative history did, to be sure, 
suggest that “rigorous analysis”216 would be demanded when weighing 
a proposed rule, but this suggestion did not mean that each rule had to 
advance “efficiency, competition, or capital formation.”217 Nor did 
there exist any requirement that a rule yield a quantifiable net benefit. 
In sum, the new language in the NSMIA was not intended to change 
the criteria by which courts should weigh SEC rulemaking. This fact is 
shown all the more through Congress’s addition of a mandate that 
requires the U.S. Commodities Future Trading Commission to 
consider a rule’s costs and benefits in other legislation.218  
So Business Roundtable, Cox and Baucom conclude, is simply 
wrong when it says the SEC has to determine that a rule yields a “net 
benefit” or promotes efficiency, competition, and capital formation.219 
Courts may have to consider these three factors, but not every rule 
must promote them.220 It is also possible, they note, that the SEC shot 
itself in the foot by specifically finding that Rule 14a-11 would enhance 
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation” even though it was not 
necessary.221  
Cox and Baucom recommend that, going forward, the SEC 
reenact the rule so that it and future rules meet the review standard 
and satisfy the language of the statute. They recommend taking three 
specific steps. First, the SEC should stop “concluding” that a proposed 
rule promotes all of the abovementioned factors: if the statute only 
requires that the SEC “consider” the rule’s impact on the factors, then 
 
 214. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b). 
 215. Cox & Baucom, supra note 205, at 1820 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 39 (1996) 
(emphasis added)).  
 216. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 217. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b). 
 218. 7 U.S.C. § 19(a); see Cox & Baucom, supra note 205, at 1823. 
 219. Cox & Baucom, supra note 205, at 1822. 
 220. See id. at 1837 (maintaining that Congress only mandated that the SEC “consider”—not 
“find” or “ensure”—that a proposed rule satisfies the triple aims of efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation). 
 221. See id. at 1840 (suggesting that the “SEC appears to have blindly walked into a trap it 
has set for itself . . . find[ing] itself hoisted by its own petard”). 
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that is all it should do.222 Second, it should defend its conclusions 
rigorously but not in the language of econometrics. A strong qualitative 
case can be made for rules whose benefits are impossible to precisely 
quantify. It may also be better if the SEC promulgated its rule in a 
different way. It should, Cox and Baucom propose, consider “staging” 
such regulatory changes to allow for a “natural experiment” on a rule, 
creating data about the rule’s impact and success before its widespread 
adoption.223 Third, because the burdens imposed by “one size fits all” 
regulations can be disproportionately great for smaller companies, the 
SEC should consider scaling regulation so that smaller issuers would 
initially enjoy less-stringent regulation until a rule’s impact could be 
measured.224 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past forty years, corporate law scholarship has moved 
through a series of stages, from wrestling with the traditional problems 
Berle and Means set out, to the attack on accepted verities launched 
by the contractarians, to a theoretical stalemate offset by new 
developments that led to the application of empirical methods. 
Through all these shifts, Jim Cox has produced an enviable body of 
scholarship and has provided a model for what a corporate law scholar 
can accomplish. He has fought tenaciously to defend shareholders 
when he believed they were threatened by new developments. He has 
kept his roots in traditional scholarship, yet has judiciously applied the 
latest tools and developments when warranted. Through his labors, he 
has moved the needle in corporate law scholarship away from 
contractarianism and toward a more open-ended paradigm. For those 
of us who are his contemporaries, we can only wish that we have as 
great an impact on the field as he has had. 
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